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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the central themes that pervades the tragedies of Sophocles is that of how 
humans relate to one another: how an individual relates to society and how self-interest is 
reconciled with the common good. Sophocles’ tragedies explore the concept of human 
political success – that is, what constitutes the best communal bond – by exploring the human 
condition, what attributes, virtues, and vices bring about success or failure. This thesis will 
examine what constitutes ‘success’ in Sophocles’ tragedies by examining the most 
‘successful’ characters, their ethics, and their actions. 
Sophocles’ masterful use of comparison enables a detailed analysis of 
characterization, ethics, and politics and, in particular, a study of the roles of emotion and 
reason in deliberation in his plays. The characters of Sophocles and their ethics have been the 
subject of detailed inquiry already with Bernard Knox’s The Heroic Temper and Mary 
Whitlock Blundell’s Helping Friends and Harming Enemies being the standard texts in this 
area. In regard to emotion’s role in tragedy Oliver Taplin’s Greek Tragedy in Action provides 
an appealing argument, although it is primarily concerned with the audience’s reception 
rather than with the text and the emotions of the characters themselves. Aristotle’s Poetics, 
while indispensable in the study of tragedy, is famously problematic, because his attempt at 
codifying the rules of dramatic composition is at times discordant with the plays themselves. 
His notion that tragedy through pity and fear prompts a catharsis of emotion is particularly 
puzzling.1 This thesis, in examining character types across three of Sophocles’ plays, will 
instead firstly ask why some characters are ‘successful’ while others are not; and secondly, 
                                                
1 Poetics, 1449b 23-28. 
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examine those secondary characters often overlooked in favor of the more dazzling primary 
characters, with this approach in turn providing a different perspective to aid understanding 
of the primary characters themselves. 
This thesis will argue that those characters who are the most successful on both the 
personal and political levels are the very same characters who are marked as ‘noble’ 
(γενναῖος, εὐγενής) and that their nobility is shown to be determined by their ethics, 
decisions, and actions, rather than by their birth. Several questions will be explored. What are 
the limits to success and happiness in the plays? How do the noble characters perceive and 
comprehend the world around them so that they are able to attain success? What is the 
relationship between their emotions and their reason? What are the actions that their nobility 
of character demands?  How is nobility of birth related to nobility of character? Why do other 
characters not see and think as the noble characters do?  What is the antithesis of nobility and 
what are its attributes? This thesis will attempt to provide some answers.  
In each chapter, I will examine one play and the character types within it, throughout 
drawing upon Aristotle’s Rhetoric for precise definitions of certain emotions and the 
Nicomachean Ethics for Aristotle’s thoughts on ethics. In the first chapter – concerned with 
the noble Odysseus and ignoble Atreidae of the Ajax – I will explore the ethics of a noble 
man by analyzing the characters according to the definitions of nobility given in the play. In 
the second chapter – concerned with the noble Neoptolemus and ignoble Odysseus of the 
Philoctetes – I will investigate how a character attains nobility. In the third chapter – 
concerned with the noble Theseus and ignoble Creon of the Oedipus at Colonus – I will 
examine more closely the rationale behind a character’s nobility. I will conclude by arguing 
that the findings of this survey can further inform our understanding of tragedy, and hope to 
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demonstrate that tragedy is particularly useful for presenting a discussion on ethics and 
politics. 
The characters and worlds of Sophocles’ tragedies are wondrous and complex; for 
over 2,500 years they have captivated authors, philosophers, psychologists, readers, and 
theater audiences. Their abiding popularity for not only the student but also the layperson is 
testament to the truth that an understanding of Sophocles’ characters constitutes not merely 
as an academic exercise but also an invitation to understand more about ourselves: who we 
are, and why. If so, Sophocles’ tragedies retain immense power.   
  
  4 
CHAPTER I: THE AJAX 
 
The first definition of ‘nobility’ in the Ajax is provided by Ajax himself. Having 
awakened from his madness, Ajax has decided he cannot bear to live with the twofold shame 
of his dishonor and his thwarted attempt at retribution for his dishonor (437-456). He 
particularly dreads the ridicule of the Atreidae and his father’s lowered opinion of him (457-
472). He is disillusioned by society because its system of rewards, supposedly based on 
merit, is revealed to be based on the whim of the leaders. In lines 473-480, he begins to 
question the point of existence and ends with the abrupt statement that “a eugenes must live 
honorably or die honorably” (479-480).2 While showing that Ajax seeks to be measured 
against a standard of nobility, this passage is otherwise too narrow to be of any real use in 
understanding what constitutes nobility. Responding to this speech, Tecmessa gives a more 
useful definition of what a noble man should and should not be. 
She begins by declaring that there is no greater evil for a human than the fate of 
compulsion (485-486), and then provides a personal example to support her point. She 
herself was forced to become Ajax’s bride and will be forced to undergo again the same 
compulsion, but this time with a Trojan, if Ajax commits suicide. Her fate is directly tied 
with his: “… on you rests all my safety” (519). In addition, his father, mother, and, above all, 
his son depend upon Ajax. Tecmessa ends her speech with an appeal to Ajax’s sense of 
honor and nobility. Her call for pity is a call for action: 
 
                                                
2 N.B. All translations given are my own. 
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Ajax, 520-524. 
 
ἀλλ’ ἴσχε κἀµοῦ µνῆστιν·ἀνδρί τοι χρεὼν  
µνήµην προσεῖναι, τερπνὸν εἴ τί που πάθῃ. 
χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίκτουσ’ ἀεί· 
ὅτου δ’ ἀπορρεῖ µνῆστις εὖ πεπονθότος, 
οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτ’ ἔθ’ οὗτος εὐγενὴς ἀνήρ. 
 
 
So remember even me; mark well that a man 
ought to keep memory alive if ever he 
experienced any good thing. For kindness always 
begets kindness; but whoever lets the memory of 
a past good done to him slip away, he can no 
longer be called noble. 
 
Central to Tecmessa’s view of nobility is the idea of reciprocity: charis begets charis 
(522). Charis, according to Aristotle, is “the feeling in respect to which the one who has it is 
said to render a service to him who needs it not in return for something nor so that others 
may render some service to him but it is done for the sake of the recipient.”3 Because charis4 
is proportionate not to what a person deserves but to what he needs, this reciprocity is not 
rooted in retributive justice but generosity. According to Tecmessa, vital to the action of 
generosity in the present is the remembrance of generosity in the past. Through the emotional 
appeal that provided the foil for her request, Tecmessa tries to compel Ajax to act with charis 
by reminding him of a past good. She seeks pity, which the chorus immediately grants her 
while imploring Ajax to do the same (525-526).  
Tecmessa’s request for remembrance and pity provides both context and direction for 
Ajax’s ethical deliberation. In invoking the past, she shows how Ajax is not the only one to 
suffer from the scales of fate: she too went from good fortune to bad through compulsion 
rather than by any choice of her own. In listing probable future consequences, she tries to 
influence Ajax’s decision by showing what adversity might result from his suicide. She 
wishes Ajax to see himself in relation to others and subsequently to act with charis. Whether 
                                                
3 Rhetoric, 2.7.2. 
4 The term ‘charis’ encapsulates both the act and feeling of generosity. 
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or not Ajax himself is noble is debatable, but the Ajax features another character who 
unequivocally demonstrates charis and whose reasoning correlates with Tecmessa’s eugenes 
aner – Odysseus. 
  Odysseus begins the play prowling about trying to determine Ajax’s whereabouts in 
order to avoid being killed. Athena sees him looking “to snatch some opportunity against 
your enemies” (2-3). He appears to behave according to the traditional Greek ethical code of 
Help Friends/ Harm Enemies. Ajax acted with hostility (δυσµενεῖ, 18) towards him and so 
Odysseus, particularly after Athena reveals to him Ajax’s motives and the extent of his 
violence, regards him as a personal enemy (ἐχθρός, 78). He also considers him to be 
dangerous, and implores Athena not to draw his attention, but is quieted when she promises 
Odysseus that he will remain safe (74-88). According to the traditional code, Ajax deserves 
Odysseus’ scorn; in fact, Athena tries to goad Odysseus into mocking the fallen hero. 
However, upon beholding the mad Ajax, and notwithstanding the fact that he hears of the 
extreme violence intended for him from Ajax’s own mouth, Odysseus undergoes a profound 
change in his view of Ajax. Athena, making a point about the power of the gods, asks 
Odysseus if he ever knew anyone to be more farsighted or better at doing what the occasion 
required than Ajax (118-120). He responds:  
Ajax, 121-126. 
 
ἐγὼ µὲν οὐδέν’ οἶδ’ · ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν 
δύστηνον ἔµπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσµενῆ, 
ὁθούνεκ’ ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ, 
οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου µᾶλλον ἢ τοὐµὸν σκοπῶν 
ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡµᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν 
εἴδωλ’ , ὅσοιπερ ζῶµεν, ἢ κούφην σκιάν. 
 
I know of no one; yet I pity him all the same 
in his wretchedness, though he was full of ill-will 
towards me, because he is yoked under terrible 
blindness. Thinking no more of this man’s fate 
than mine, I see that we are truly nothing other 
than phantoms, all we who live, or fleeting 
shadow.  
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Ajax, once regarded by Odysseus as an echthros, a personal enemy, is now 
considered ‘hostile’ (δυσµενῆ, 122): the ill-will Ajax bears Odysseus is no longer 
reciprocated. Through pity (ἐποικτίρω, 121), Odysseus sees Ajax as being like him, “a 
phantom” or “fleeting shadow” (126). Aristotle defines pity and the circumstances that incite 
pity as follows: “People pity those like them in age, in character, in habits, in purpose, and in 
birth: for through these particulars it is more apparent to a man that [when something bad 
happens to one like him] that evil can also happen to him. So it is necessary here to put forth 
a general premise that whatever things people fear for themselves, when they happen to 
others pity is aroused in them.”5 Odysseus pities Ajax because he perceives that, as mortals, 
they share a similar birth and the common enemy of ate. In its original sense, ate was 
connected with physical blindness6 and therefore aptly describes Ajax’s inability to see with 
the physical eye what he is really doing, and with the eye of the mind that his actions are 
unjust. In addition, Richard Doyle points out that in this play ate is associated with moros, 
fate, “which Sophocles consistently uses to signify ‘death’.”7 Ajax’s ate is, therefore, both 
his blindness and the death that blindness brings. Odysseus, in seeing himself in Ajax and in 
seeing their common humanity, extrapolates Ajax’s ate to describe the blindness that all 
humans by their very nature are subject to. His earlier statement that “we know nothing for 
certain; we are all at sea” (23) captures this blindness that constitutes the fundamental 
obstacle to human happiness.  
                                                
5 Rhetoric, 2.8.3. 
6 Cf. Iliad 16.805. 
7 Doyle, p. 5. 
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It is important to note that his reasoning and pity are a direct result of his seeing Ajax 
in person; otherwise he might continue to operate under strict self-interest. Although 
beginning as a visceral action, his pity becomes a rational response through his awareness of 
self and how he relates to another. Therefore, like Tecmessa’s eugenes aner, Odysseus’ 
deliberation involves both reason and emotion, namely pity; but what Odysseus’s speech 
shows is that his deliberation explicitly begins with pity, which leads to a conscious 
awareness of man’s helplessness – the realization that Tecmessa’s speech begins with. The 
nature of his response to Ajax’s predicament is put into the larger context of the human 
condition, and his actions later in the play demonstrate that his reasoning leads to his giving 
charis (1354) to Ajax by advocating his burial despite the opposition of the Atreidae.  
Odysseus has all the markings of a noble man: his reasoning is initiated by pity and in 
turn leads to an action of charis. Why, however, should we view Tecmessa’s definition and 
Odysseus’ example as truly correlating with nobility, particularly if humans by nature have a 
tendency to misjudge? An external authority is required, and it is given by the goddess 
Athena. In response to Odysseus’ speech where he pities Ajax, Athena says:  
 
Ajax, 127- 133. 
 
τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰσορῶν ὑπέρκοπον 
µηδέν ποτ’ εἴπῃς αὐτὸς ἐς θεοὺς ἔπος, 
µηδ’ ὄγκον ἄρῃ µηδέν’, εἴ τινος πλέον  
ἢ χειρὶ βρίθεις ἢ µακροῦ πλούτου βάθει· 
ὡς ἡµέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν 
ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπεια· τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας 
θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακούς. 
 
 
Therefore in respecting these things you yourself 
never speak an arrogant word against the gods, nor 
take upon yourself any self-importance, if fate’s 
scales make you weightier than another in power or 
in the extent of immense wealth; as a day tips the 
scale down on all human affairs, so it raises them 
back up; and so it is the men of sense the gods love 
and the bad they hate.  
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Athena affirms Odysseus’ ethics8 and further emphasizes how a man should act with 
an awareness of what is immutable and what is not. According to the goddess, a sophron is 
not arrogant towards gods or men. He does not ascribe to himself an undeserved sense of 
self-importance in relation to humans because he is aware of the fickleness of fortune (129-
130), nor in relation to the gods because he is aware of their superior power (128). The 
resulting knowledge is an awareness of the human condition’s frailty. Because Athena’s 
definition of a sophron, particularly in regards to his awareness of time and the human 
condition, is so similar to Tecmessa’s eugenes aner, Tecmessa’s description is given greater 
authority. Odysseus, then, is a combination of Athena’s sophron and Tecmessa’s eugenes 
aner. The sophron, however, in addition to being like the eugenes aner and knowing how to 
behave correctly towards other humans, knows how to act correctly towards the gods; 
because the eugenes aner is therefore a subset of the sophron,9 sophrosyne is the virtue that 
leads to ethical nobility.10 
In the general Greek conception, sophrosyne is the embodiment of the two maxims on 
the temple to Apollo at Delphi: “know thyself” and “nothing in excess.” Helen North defines 
sophrosyne as basically “soundness of mind” that is “the state of having one’s intellect 
                                                
8 Smyth’s Greek Grammar states that τοιοῦτος “generally refers to what precedes” (Smyth, 1245). 
9 Athena’s contrast of the sophron with the kakos and the similarity between the sophron and the eugenes aner 
invites another interpretation of kakos. Kakos is often used elsewhere to describe a member of the lower class, 
but as this term for a low-born man is contrasted with the sophron who is ethically noble, kakos would suggest 
someone who is ethically ignoble. Being low-born, therefore, doesn’t mean so much one who is lower in birth 
as one who chooses to act in a manner beneath his nature. Teucer in his speech in lines 1266-1315 argues this 
point. He shows the discrepancy between the noble Atreidae’s ignoble behavior and contrasts them with his 
own actions that are noble regardless of his ignoble birth. 
10Sophrosyne manifested in action towards human beings is nobility and towards the gods is eusebeia. As 
Sophocles’ plays are more concerned with human matters than human-divine relations, it makes sense that the 
questions of what constitutes nobility are more prominent than what constitutes eusebeia. 
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unimpaired.”11 She notes that the emotions are a part of sophrosyne, which she defines as  
“‘saving phronêsis’ (as the traditional etymology has it) from the assaults of appetite and 
passion but at the same time making use of their motive power to reach goals unattainable 
without them.”12 This word, then, aptly describes both the self-knowledge and moderation 
that results from Odysseus’ reasoning and the reasoning itself. As the etymology of the word 
indicates, sophrosyne is ‘healthy thinking’; that is, having a well-balanced phren. LSJ states 
that the phren is the seat of both reason and the emotions.13 Sophrosyne, then, would be a 
balance between emotion and reason rather than a purgation of the emotions. Odysseus 
achieves this balance of phren by basing his ethical deliberation on rationalizing his pity. His 
sophrosyne is neither a purely visceral emotion nor strict practical thinking; after all, 
practical thinking would have him continue to treat Ajax as a personal enemy.  
If Odysseus is noble in character, then it naturally follows that his ethical opponents, 
the Atreidae, are ignoble. Yet the Atreidae claim to possess sophrosyne and to act out of a 
sense of nobility. Their definitions of these two terms are very different from the definitions 
provided by Tecmessa and Athena, and their subsequent actions are the opposite of the 
charis of Odysseus.  
                                                
11 North, p. x. 
12 North, p. x. 
13 LSJ further defines the first meaning of the phren (φρήν), meaning ‘midriff,’ as follows: ‘2. heart, as seat of 
the passions, e.g. of fear, “τροµέοντο δέ οἱ φρένες ἐντός” Il.10.10; of joy and grief, “φρένα τέρπεσθαι 
φόρµιγγι” 9.186; “γάνυται φρένα ποιµήν” 13.493; “τί σε φρένας ἵκετοπένθος” 1.362; “ἄχος πύκασε φρένας” 
8.124; “ἔρως φρένας ἀµφεκάλυψε” 3.442; of anger, Od.6.147; of courage, “ἕνα φρεσὶ θυµὸν ἔχοντες” 
Il.13.487; “ἐς φρένα θυµὸς ἀγέρθη” 22.475, cf. 8.202 etc.’ and as ‘3. mind, as seat of the mental faculties, 
perception, thought, ἔγνω ᾖσιν ἐνὶ φ.” Il.22.296; “µή µοι ταῦτα νόει φρεσί” 9.600; “µετὰ φρεσὶ µερµηρίξαι, 
βάλλεσθαι,” Od.10.438, Il.9.434; “ἴδµεν ἐνὶ φρεσίν” 2.301.’ 
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Menelaus believes that Ajax, as a would-be murderer of the high command (1126- 
1128), should be punished for threatening the fragile stability of the army and by analogy the 
state: 
Ajax, 1071-1090. 
 
καίτοι κακοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ὄντα δηµότην  
µηδὲν δικαιοῦν τῶν ἐφεστώτων κλύειν. 
οὐ γάρ ποτ’ οὔτ’ ἂν ἐν πόλει νόµοι καλῶς 
φέροιντ’ ἄν, ἔνθα µὴ καθεστήκοι δέος, 
οὔτ’ ἂν στρατός γε σωφρόνως ἄρχοιτ’ ἔτι,  
µηδὲν φόβου πρόβληµα µηδ’ αἰδοῦς ἔχων. 
ἀλλ’ ἄνδρα χρή, κἂν σῶµα γεννήσῃ µέγα, 
δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἂν κἂν ἀπὸ σµικροῦ κακοῦ. 
δέος γὰρ ᾧ πρόσεστιν αἰσχύνη θ’ ὁµοῦ, 
σωτηρίαν ἔχοντα τόνδ’ ἐπίστασο·  
ὅπου δ’ ὑβρίζειν δρᾶν θ’ ἃ βούλεται παρῇ, 
ταύτην νόµιζε τὴν πόλιν χρόνῳ ποτὲ 
ἐξ οὐρίων δραµοῦσαν εἰς βυθὸν πεσεῖν. 
ἀλλ’ ἑστάτω µοι καὶ δέος τι καίριον, 
καὶ µὴ δοκῶµεν δρῶντες ἃν ἡδώµεθα  
οὐκ ἀντιτείσειν αὖθις ἃν λυπώµεθα. 
ἕρπει παραλλὰξ ταῦτα. πρόσθεν οὗτος ἦν 
αἴθων ὑβριστής, νῦν δ’ ἐγὼ µέγ’ αὖ φρονῶ. 
καί σοι προφωνῶ τόνδε µὴ θάπτειν, ὅπως 
µὴ τόνδε θάπτων αὐτὸς ἐς ταφὰς πέσῃς. 
 
  
Moreover, justice deems it the mark of a base 
man for a commoner not to heed those set over 
him. For never in a city do the laws rightly 
guide where fear has no footing, nor can an 
army at least be ruled prudently if it no longer 
has the defense of fear and shame. No, it is 
necessary for a man even one by birth strong in 
body, to expect to fall perchance by a small ill. 
Whoever has fear and shame together know for 
certain he has safety; but where there is 
opportunity to commit outrage and do what 
one wishes, know that such a state, although 
having run with fair winds before, falls into the 
depths. No, let me see fear, whenever 
opportune, also established and let us not 
imagine we can do what gives us joy and not in 
turn endure the punishment of being pained. 
These things come in turns. This man before 
was ablaze with committing outrage, but now 
it’s my turn to think presumptuously. And I 
warn you now not to bury this man, lest you 
yourself in burying this man fall into the grave. 
 
His brother Agamemnon concurs, arguing further that insubordination of the lower class 
threatens the order of the state: 
Ajax, 1239-1261. 
 
πικροὺς ἔοιγµεν τῶν Ἀχιλλείων ὅπλων 
ἀγῶνας Ἀργείοισι κηρῦξαι τότε,  
εἰ πανταχοῦ φανούµεθ’ ἐκ Τεύκρου κακοί, 
κοὐκ ἀρκέσει ποθ’ ὑµὶν οὐδ’ ἡσσηµένοις 
εἴκειν ἃ τοῖς πολλοῖσιν ἤρεσκεν κριταῖς, 
 
I think we shall keenly regret announcing on 
that day the contests for Achilles’ armor 
if we in every case are going to be thought 
false by Teucer and you never will be content 
and, although beaten, never yield to what most 
  12 
ἀλλ’ αἰὲν ἡµᾶς ἢ κακοῖς βαλεῖτέ που 
ἢ σὺν δόλῳ κεντήσεθ’ οἱ λελειµµένοι.  
ἐκ τῶνδε µέντοι τῶν τρόπων οὐκ ἄν ποτε 
κατάστασις γένοιτ’ ἂν οὐδενὸς νόµου, 
εἰ τοὺς δίκῃ νικῶντας ἐξωθήσοµεν 
καὶ τοὺς ὄπισθεν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν ἄξοµεν. 
ἀλλ’ εἰρκτέον τάδ’ ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ οἱ πλατεῖς  
οὐδ’ εὐρύνωτοι φῶτες ἀσφαλέστατοι, 
ἀλλ’ οἱ φρονοῦντες εὖ κρατοῦσι πανταχοῦ. 
µέγας δὲ πλευρὰ βοῦς ὑπὸ σµικρᾶς ὅµως 
µάστιγος ὀρθὸς εἰς ὁδὸν πορεύεται. 
καὶ σοὶ προσέρπον τοῦτ’ ἐγὼ τὸ φάρµακον  
ὁρῶ τάχ’, εἰ µὴ νοῦν κατακτήσῃ τινά· 
ὃς τἀνδρὸς οὐκέτ’ ὄντος, ἀλλ’ ἤδη σκιᾶς, 
θαρσῶν ὑβρίζεις κἀξελευθεροστοµεῖς.  
οὐ σωφρονήσεις; οὐ µαθὼν ὃς εἶ φύσιν 
ἄλλον τιν’ ἄξεις ἄνδρα δεῦρ’ ἐλεύθερον,  
ὅστις πρὸς ἡµᾶς ἀντὶ σοῦ λέξει τὰ σά; 
judges were satisfied with, but will always 
somewhere attack us with abuses or stab us in 
the dark, you losers in the race.To be sure from 
these ways no resolute order could ever, ever 
exist if we are to thrust aside those who rightly 
won and bring the losers to the front. 
No, this must be prevented. For it’s not the 
strong, broad-shouldered men who are the 
surest from danger but those who think well 
who always win. A large-ribbed ox still treads 
a straight path because of a small whip. And 
this remedy, I think, is coming to you soon if 
you do not gain some sense; you who, although 
the man no longer lives but is now a shade, 
boldly commit outrage and freely wag your 
tongue. Will you not come to your senses? Not 
knowing who you are by birth will you not 
lead some other man here – a freeborn man – 
who will speak on your behalf before us?  
 
Agamemnon argues that it is those who possess sophrosyne, not those who use 
physical force, who are successful (1250-1252). This statement would seem to correlate with 
Athena’s evaluation that the sophron does not use the gifts of fortune against others, but in 
reality the Atreidae’s definition of the virtue is vastly different. Sophrosyne for the Atreidae 
is closely tied with their view of nobility. The Atreidae, being nobly born, believe that they 
are blessed by the gods to keep order in the manner they see fit (1061). Defined by their rank, 
they evaluate others by their status and are blind to their merits. They are the winners of birth 
and, therefore, should always be obeyed by the losers (1246-1249; 1071-1072). In their eyes, 
Teucer, in challenging them, is not acting with sophrosyne because his lower-status requires 
him to obey his leaders without question (1255-1263). Odysseus, because he is more of an 
equal, is respected (1330-1331), though grudingingly (1370-1372). Sophrosyne, on 
Agamemnon’s terms, is when those who have power rule, and those who do not obey (1073-
  13 
1076, 1352). There is no objective criterion at the heart of his reasoning; instead, whatever is 
against their rule is unjust, shameful, and not according to sophrosyne. Their sophrosyne is 
‘be moderate’ in the sense of ‘do not act outside one’s social boundaries,’ but the Atreidae in 
their actions contradict their own view of sophrosyne by disregarding the laws of the gods 
(1343-1345) in refusing to show charis to the dead Ajax (1267). The Atreidae go too far in 
their rule. They do not pity because they see the differences in status, not the commonalities 
in nature, between themselves and Ajax (1132-1134; 1356). 
When there is insubordination, their primary mode of correction is through the 
external rule of phobos and aidos (1075-1076, 1079-1080). Words and reasoning are 
ineffective in an army because that is not how a rule of fear and shame is carried out. 
Menelaus believes “it would be disgraceful if anyone learned that I was chastising with 
words when I could use force” (1159-1160). They prefer compulsion through violence 
(1067-1072) and silencing of opposition (1147-1149). Because the Atreidae are the 
determiners of what is just, for the sake of maintaining stability violent actions are justifed 
(1324, 1062-1090) even to the point of committing hubris.  
The Atreidae do not believe the term ‘hubris’ properly applies to them, but instead to 
those in inferior positions, like Ajax and Teucer, who question their decree (1088; 1257-
1258). Their actions, however, constitute hubris, as the chorus proclaim (1092). As Fisher 
repeatedly points out, hubris “is essentially a deliberate activity” and can be traced to 
“specific acts.”14 Aristotle says hubris is “when a man does or says things that cause shame 
to the one suffering, not in order that something may happen to him, nor because anything 
                                                
14  Fisher, p. 1. 
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has happened to him, but merely for his own pleasure.”15 It would therefore be one thing if 
the Atreidae punished Ajax for his attempted murder, but by transgressing the laws of the 
gods (1131, 1343-1344), overriding justice (1334-1335), and bringing excessive shame on 
Ajax through denying his right as a mortal for burial and in wishing to defile his corpse, the 
Atreidae engage in hubris.  
As they are incapable of friendship, they foster no friendship as the chorus note (619). 
In their view of nobility, their definition of sophrosyne, and their belief on how to rule, they 
fail to achieve the stability of the state they desire. While fear and shame constitute effective 
means of maintaining order, particularly in an army, they require the subordination of 
personal desires for the good of the community, not out of choice but from compulsion. The 
state may achieve success, but at the expense of the individual. 
  
                                                
15 Rhetoric, 2.2.5. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PHILOCTETES 
 
At the beginning of the Philoctetes, Odysseus persuades Neoptolemus to do as he 
asks and give himself up “for a few hours of shamelessness and later for the rest of time be 
called the most dutiful of men” (81-85) so that they might accomplish their mission. 
Prophecy decrees (610-613) that Philoctetes’ bow is required in Troy for the benefit of the 
Achaeans, and as is revealed towards the end of the play, Philoctetes himself will benefit 
from going because the cure for his diseased foot is to be found at the city (1332-1347). 
Thus, Odysseus’ desire to bring Philoctetes back seeks what is best for both the individual 
and the common good, but the reasoning and methods for the just telos of the Odysseus of 
the Philoctetes do not correlate with the charis and sophrosyne of the Odysseus of the Ajax. 
Nobility, according to Odysseus in the Philoctetes, is being victorious no matter the means, a 
view which he openly discloses to Neoptolemus and Philoctetes: 
 
Philoctetes, 1047-1062. 
 
πόλλ’ ἂν λέγειν ἔχοιµι πρὸς τὰ τοῦδ’ ἔπη, 
εἴ µοι παρείκοι· νῦν δ’ ἑνὸς κρατῶ λόγου. 
οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτός εἰµ’ ἐγώ· 
χὤπου δικαίων κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίσις, 
οὐκ ἂν λάβοις µου µᾶλλον οὐδέν’ εὐσεβῆ. 
νικᾶν γε µέντοι πανταχοῦ χρῄζων ἔφυν, 
πλὴν ἐς σέ· νῦν δὲ σοί γ’ ἑκὼν ἐκστήσοµαι. 
ἄφετε γὰρ αὐτόν, µηδὲ προσψαύσητ’ ἔτι. 
ἐᾶτε µίµνειν. οὐδὲ σοῦ προσχρῄζοµεν,  
τά γ’ ὅπλ’ ἔχοντες ταῦτ’· ἐπεὶ πάρεστι µὲν 
Τεῦκρος παρ’ ἡµῖν, τήνδ’ ἐπιστήµην ἔχων, 
ἐγώ θ’, ὃς οἶµαι σοῦ κάκιον οὐδὲν ἂν 
τούτων κρατύνειν, µηδ’ ἐπιθύνειν χερί. 
τί δῆτα σοῦ δεῖ; χαῖρε τὴν Λῆµνον πατῶν. 
 
 
I could say much in answer to his claims, if 
time allowed; but now I can say one thing only. 
What kind of man the occasion demands, that is 
the man I am. And accordingly, where the 
judgment at hand is of just and good men, you 
could find no man more pious than me. 
Victory, however, is my inborn desire in every 
field—save with regard to you. To you, in this 
case, I will gladly give way. Yes, release him, 
and lay not another finger upon him. Let him 
stay here. We have no further need of you, now 
that we have these weapons. For Teucer is there 
among our forces, well-skilled in this craft, as 
am I, and I believe that I can master this bow in 
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ἡµεῖς δ’ ἴωµεν. καὶ τάχ’ ἂν τὸ σὸν γέρας 
τιµὴν ἐµοὶ νείµειεν, ἣν σὲ χρῆν ἔχειν. 
no way worse than you, and point it with no 
worse a hand. So what need is there of you? 
Farewell! Enjoy your strolls on Lemnos! We 
must be going. And perhaps your onetime prize 
will bring me the honor which ought to have 
been your own. 
 
As Odysseus will be whatever sort of man he needs to be (1049) in order to satisfy his 
inborn desire for victory (1052), his reasoning is relative. His definition of Help Friends/ 
Harm Enemies changes according to the dictates of the moment. A crafty wordsmith, 
Odysseus has the appearance, but not the substance, of sophrosyne. He claims that no one is 
more ‘pious’ (εὐσεβῆ, 1051) in obeying the judgments of good and just men; but since he has 
already made justice and goodness void of real meaning because they too are determined by 
the dictates of the moment (82-85), his claim to piety is merely a pretense. He sarcastically 
‘yields’ to Philoctetes by granting his desire not to sail to Troy (1055), but he dishonorably 
takes away Philoctetes’ bow, his sole means of survival, so that he effectively dooms 
Philoctetes to death. In taking the bow, he seeks to gain honor for himself at the direct 
expense of the undeserving Philoctetes (1061-1062). This rationale leads to hubris. 
The three mentions of hubris in the play apply to the Atreidae’s and Odysseus’ 
involvement in the awarding of Achilles’ armor. Philoctetes, hearing about Neoptolemus’ 
humiliation (330) asks for details about the act of hubris (342), a term echoed by the chorus 
to describe the Atreidae’s actions (396f.). Later on, having been reprimanded by 
Neoptolemus for his obstinacy in refusing to sail for Troy, Philoctetes reminds him of the 
hubris they committed against him (1364f.). All these references are to the humiliating 
robbing of a geras from its rightful owner, an obvious parallel to the shameful robbing of 
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Philoctetes’ bow, a gift from Heracles. Odysseus’ theft of the bow is shown to be hubristic in 
all but name: this is rather fitting in a play concerned with phusis in opposition to nomos and 
with words against deeds. His theft is a single act that is meant both to shame and grievously 
harm an inferior. It is excessive in that, because of the curious presentation of Helenus’ 
prophecy in lines 610-613, Odysseus was free to decide whether to force Philoctetes to go to 
Troy or to leave him on the island. Of these two shameful choices Odysseus chooses the 
more shameful and ignoble because by leaving Philoctetes alone and helpless on the island, 
he is committing the antithesis of charis.  
Just like the Atreidae, Odysseus places the common good over the good of the 
individual, thereby making politics the basis of ethics. He denies Philoctetes the right of 
choice and abuses his philia with Neoptolemus by tricking him into behaving against his 
noble phusis (79-80; 88-89) in order to gain victory. It is fitting that Odysseus says Athena 
Polias as Nike brings him success and safety (134). His cunning serves victory and the polis; 
yet his hubris would, without the intervention of the noble Heracles, prevent the success of 
his mission. 
Neoptolemus expressly declares his desire to be eugenes, by living up to his own and 
his father’s nature (86-89). It is this desire that Odysseus perverts by cajoling Neoptolemus 
into following his plan by promising he will be called eusebestatos (83-85), and sophos and 
agathos (119). Neoptolemus, however, comes to reject Odysseus’ ethics because he realizes 
that it is the essence, the phusis, that determines character rather than any superficial name it 
bears. The progression in Neoptolemus’ view of nobility provides a rich example for the 
emotions’ role in sophrosyne. His decision that acting according to nobility requires him to 
help his philos elucidates the relationship between philia and nobility. 
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After becoming instant friends with the young warrior, Philoctetes thrice calls 
Neoptolemus noble. Philoctetes, overcome by an intense wave of pain from his wound, 
beseeches the gennaion teknon (799) to help him, just as he once helped Heracles, and not to 
leave him alone (808-809). Neoptolemus, out of the pain he feels at seeing the man in his 
misfortune (806), remains, comforting Philoctetes as best he can. After waking from his 
slumber, Philoctetes praises the youth for his endurance in staying by him even though it is 
personally inconvenient for him (876). He contrasts the youth’s noble nature (εὐγενὴς γὰρ ἡ 
φύσις κἀξ εὐγενῶν, 874) with that of the Atreidae (872-875). Neoptolemus, who had feared 
that death was near, rejoices to see Philoctetes free from pain. While helping Philoctetes to 
his feet, he suddenly realizes (παπαῖ, 895) the implications of his actions. He is forsaking his 
true nature (902-903) and fears most of all to be base (906), but he does not know what to do. 
He is in aporia (807). He is pulled between the conflicting claims of duty (τό τ’ ἔνδικον, 
926) and advantage (τὸ συµφέρον, 926) on the one hand, and his friendship with Philoctetes 
on the other. After the disclosure of his actual intentions, Neoptolemus is silent for the next 
146 lines except for two statements, the repetition of his aporia and a suggestion of what 
releases him from it: strange pity (οἶκτος δεινός, 965-966). After silently listening, for the 
most part, to the stinging rhesis of Philoctetes (927-962) and the heated stichomythia 
between Philoctetes and the newly returned Odysseus, Neoptolemus has come to his 
decision. He will help Philoctetes. 
The steps of his reasoning can be traced through his speeches. Neoptolemus’ change 
in reasoning (1074-1075) is first instigated upon his recognition of the pity he has been 
feeling for Philoctetes since seeing his newfound friend in such great pain. He even feared 
for his death. His awareness of his visceral response to Philoctetes’ pain and the self-
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examination his pity prompts leads him to change his course of action. He decides to return 
the charis of friendship Philoctetes earlier gave him with his own charis. After returning the 
bow and preparing to conduct Philoctetes back home, as his friend wishes, Neoptolemus for 
the third time is marked as noble. In this instance, rather than being described as gennaios, 
Neoptolemus’ charis – that is, the manifestation of his sophrosyne – is deemed ‘noble’ by 
Philoctetes: “oh what a noble word you have spoken!” (ὦ γενναῖον εἰρηκὼς ἔπος, 1402). 
Before, Neoptolemus sought to live up to the nobility of his father; now, his actions towards 
Philoctetes substantiate his earlier words, showing that he is in fact noble in character and not 
just in name (1310). 
As Blundell insightfully recognizes, in order for Neoptolemus’ motives to remain 
pure he cannot be the one who finally succeeds in persuading Philoctetes to sail for Troy, as 
the myth and prophecy mandate, because his returning of the bow could be construed as 
merely another means to get his way according to “Odyssean self-interest.”16 Through 
Heracles’ deus ex machina, Neoptolemus’ nobility is proven to be according to charis alone 
and, moreover, is authenticated by the god’s speech. Heracles’ motives, his self-identification 
with the two mortals, and his exhortation all correlate with Neoptolemus’ reasoning, so that 
his speech provides a perfect summation for Neoptolemus’ ethics: 
 
Philoctetes, 1413-1422; 1433-1444. 
 
τὴν σὴν δ’ ἥκω χάριν οὐρανίας 
ἕδρας προλιπών, 
τὰ Διός τε φράσων βουλεύµατά σοι,  
 
 
And for your benefit I have come 
leaving behind the seats of heaven, to show 
you the will of Zeus, and to hold you back 
                                                
16 Blundell, p. 223. 
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κατερητύσων θ’ ὁδὸν ἣν στέλλῃ· 
σὺ δ’ ἐµῶν µύθων ἐπάκουσον. 
καὶ πρῶτα µέν σοι τὰς ἐµὰς λέξω τύχας, 
ὅσους πονήσας καὶ διεξελθὼν πόνους 
ἀθάνατον ἀρετὴν ἔσχον, ὡς πάρεσθ’ ὁρᾶν 
καὶ σοί, σάφ’ ἴσθι, τοῦτ’ ὀφείλεται παθεῖν, 
ἐκ τῶν πόνων τῶνδ’ εὐκλεᾶ θέσθαι βίον. 
. . . 
καὶ σοὶ ταὔτ’, Ἀχιλλέως τέκνον, 
παρῄνεσ’· οὔτε γὰρ σὺ τοῦδ’ ἄτερ σθένεις 
ἑλεῖν τὸ Τροίας πεδίον οὔθ’ οὗτος σέθεν· 
ἀλλ’ ὡς λέοντε συννόµω φυλάσσετον 
οὗτος σὲ καὶ σὺ τόνδ’. ἐγὼ δ’ Ἀσκληπιὸν 
παυστῆρα πέµψω σῆς νόσου πρὸς Ἴλιον. 
τὸ δεύτερον γὰρ τοῖς ἐµοῖς αὐτὴν χρεὼν 
τόξοις ἁλῶναι. τοῦτο δ’ ἐννοεῖθ’, ὅταν  
πορθῆτε γαῖαν, εὐσεβεῖν τὰ πρὸς θεούς· 
ὡς τἄλλα πάντα δεύτερ’ ἡγεῖται πατὴρ 
Ζεύς. οὐ γὰρ ηὑσέβεια συνθνῄσκει βροτοῖς· 
κἂν ζῶσι κἂν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται. 
from the journey which you are preparing for; 
so hear my words. First I shall tell you my 
fortunes, how many labors I underwent and 
completed to the very end. I won deathless 
excellence, as you see before you now. Know 
well that for you too suffering is destined, that 
from these sufferings you will make for 
yourself a glorious life. 
. . . 
Son of Achilles, the same advice applies to 
you too; for without him you will not have the 
power to take the plain of Troy nor he without 
you; but like two kindred lions on the hunt 
this man must guard you and you this man. 
[turns to Philoctetes] And I shall send 
Asclepius to Troy to end your sickness 
because it is destined to be taken by my 
arrows for a second time. But both of you 
remember this, whenever you ravage the land, 
show reverence to the gods; as all other things 
father Zeus regards as second; for reverence 
to the gods does not die with men; whether 
they are alive or dead, it is never lost.  
 
Heracles, connecting with the two mortals through their shared fortunes, praises 
friendship and the personal and political success it brings. He comes to rectify the situation 
out of a sense of charis (τὴν σὴν δ’ ἥκω χάριν, 1413), in particular because Philoctetes was 
his friend and showed him charis in the past (801-803). He encapsulates Philoctetes’ and 
Neoptolemus’ relationship with the simile found in lines 1436-1437: “… like two kindred 
lions on the hunt this man must guard you and you this man.” In an earlier statement, 
Neoptolemus declared that “whoever knows how to return a kindness is a friend more 
precious than any possession” (671-674). By returning the bow, Neoptolemus proves that he, 
as a noble man, is the best sort of friend. It is through philia that Neoptolemus and 
Philoctetes will be unbeatable, bringing success both for themselves and for their community. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE OEDIPUS AT COLONUS 
The Oedipus at Colonus features the most obvious example of a noble character to be 
found in Sophocles’ tragedies. Theseus’ resolute ethos coupled with his succinctly expressed 
speeches mark him as noble; indeed, he is distinctly associated with nobility three times 
during the course of the play, twice by Oedipus and once by the Messenger.17 The first 
instance is in response to Theseus’ expression of his ethics in his very first speech; the other 
two instances are in response to the manifestations of these ethics in his actions. Theseus’ 
first speech in particular provides a rich illustration for how pity is part of rational judgment.  
After being summoned by the chorus concerning Oedipus’ defilement of the sacred 
grove, Theseus appears, immediately recognizing and pitying the foreigner. In this speech, 
Theseus reveals how he perceives the world and how his comprehension of it motivates his 
actions. In response, Oedipus deems that Theseus’ praiseworthy words and promised actions 
constitute ‘nobility’ (τὸ σὸν γενναῖον, 571). 
 
OC, 551-568. 
 
πολλῶν ἀκούων ἔν τε τῷ πάρος χρόνῳ 
τὰς αἱµατηρὰς ὀµµάτων διαφθορὰς 
ἔγνωκά σ’, ὦ παῖ Λαΐου, τανῦν θ’ ὁδοῖς 
ἐν ταῖσδε ἀκούων µᾶλλον ἐξεπίσταµαι. 
σκευή τε γάρ σε καὶ τὸ δύστηνον κάρα  
δηλοῦτον ἡµῖν ὄνθ’ ὃς εἶ, καί σ’ οἰκτίσας 
θέλω ’περέσθαι, δύσµορ’ Οἰδίπου, τίνα 
πόλεως ἐπέστης προστροπὴν ἐµοῦ τ’ ἔχων,  
αὐτός τε χἠ σὴ δύσµορος παραστάτις. 
δίδασκε· δεινὴν γάρ τιν’ ἂν πρᾶξιν τύχοις  
 
 
Through hearing from many in the past about 
the bloody blinding of your eyes, I recognized 
you, son of Laius, and now hearing more on 
my way here I am certain. For your attire and 
unhappy demeanor make it clear to me who 
you are and so from my pity I wish to enquire, 
ill-fated Oedipus, what is this petition you 
have set before the city and me, you yourself 
and your unfortunate companion with you. 
Tell me: for you would have to speak of an 
                                                
17 Because of Oedipus’ characterization as a quasi-prophet favored by the gods, his statements concerning 
Theseus’ nobility are highly authoritative. 
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λέξας ὁποίας ἐξαφισταίµην ἐγώ· 
ὡς οἶδά καὐτὸς ὡς ἐπαιδεύθην ξένος, 
ὥσπερ σύ, χὤς τις πλεῖστ’ ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ ξένης 
ἤθλησα κινδυνεύµατ’ ἐν τὠµῷ κάρᾳ, 
ὥστε ξένον γ’ ἂν οὐδέν’ ὄνθ’, ὥσπερ σὺ  
νῦν, ὑπεκτραποίµην µὴ οὐ συνεκσῴζειν· ἐπεὶ 
ἔξοιδ’ ἀνὴρ ὢν χὤτι τῆς ἐς αὔριον 
οὐδὲν πλέον µοι σοῦ µέτεστιν ἡµέρας. 
awful petition for me to withdraw from it; 
since I too know what it is to be an exile, just 
as you are, as I was raised in exile and in exile 
contended with dangers to my life like no 
other man; so that I would never turn aside 
from a stranger or refuse to help save him; 
since I know very well that I am a man and 
that I have no more claim on tomorrow than 
you. 
 
The speech itself is a rational progression from perception, to conjecture, to 
knowledge, to a general truth that motivates Theseus’ active desire to help Oedipus, but his 
reasoning is based upon and shaped by pity. In the first section (551-559), Theseus 
recognizes Oedipus through two means, hearsay and personal perception, that together form 
his episteme (ἐξεπίσταµαι, 554) of who Oedipus is. As the explanatory γάρ (555) indicates, 
his episteme directly leads to his pity (καί σ’ οἰκτίσας, 556) and his pity in turn further shapes 
his episteme, resulting in his desire to help Oedipus. While beginning as a visceral reaction to 
Oedipus’ mien, this pity becomes a rational judgment through Theseus’ awareness of the 
emotion. Robert Solomon’s argument about emotions and choice can be usefully adapted 
here: because Theseus is aware he feels pity, he is no longer being compassionate but acting 
compassionate. His pity is no longer an impulsive reaction but a matter of choice. His pity, 
then, shapes his reasoning and his reasoning shapes his pity, culminating in a general truth 
(567-568), which is really an extension of his episteme of Oedipus. Theseus pities the painful 
misfortune of Oedipus on two levels: he has personally experienced a similar misfortune in 
the past and knows that he will experience the same, general fate of death in the future. 
Recognizing that they have similar experiences and, as mortals, share the same opposition to 
time, Theseus immediately views Oedipus as his friend (891, 1169, 1631). Like Neoptolemus 
  23 
who gave charis to Philoctetes, thus enabling him to choose for himself, Theseus offers 
Oedipus protection to make whatever choice he wishes (638-641).  
The other two instances of Theseus’ marked nobility occur after he has through action 
demonstrated the ethics that he has already expressed in speech. After Theseus prevents 
Creon’s violence against Oedipus and promises to restore his daughters, Oedipus blesses him 
for the sake of his ‘nobility’ (τοῦ τε γενναίου χάριν, 1042). Later, Theseus’ subordination of 
his own personal grief (1636) for the care of Oedipus’ children is deemed by the Messenger 
to be done “like a nobleman” (ὡς ἀνὴρ γενναῖος, 1636). 
It is striking that in all three marked references to his nobility, Theseus himself is not 
directly called γενναῖος; instead, either his actions and words are identified with the abstract 
τὸ γενναῖον or he is compared to the ideal γενναῖος. This abstraction of his nobility is no 
small point of semantics. Theseus, as the son of Athens’ king, is undeniably γενναῖος in the 
strict sense that he is noble in birth, but Theseus’ τὸ γενναῖον is nobility that directly results 
from his decisions and actions. Since according to Aristotle it is choice that determines 
ethos18 rather than inherent qualities of character (such as noble birth), Theseus’ character 
achieves true nobility because it stems from choice rather than chance. It is this active aspect 
of nobility that Oedipus praises. 
Creon provides the clearest example of a character without the qualities of an 
ethically noble man. He is the antithesis of Theseus because he does not possess sophrosyne, 
he commits hubris, and he prevents philia. His ignoble ethics stem from his narrow definition 
                                                
18 Poetics, 1450b 8-10. 
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of nobility, as is shown in his first speech. With the thin veil of respect he presents soon 
discarded, he quickly reveals his true intentions and the violent means of fulfilling them. 
 
OC, 728-760. 
 
ἄνδρες χθονὸς τῆσδ’ εὐγενεῖς οἰκήτορες, 
ὁρῶ τιν’ ὑµᾶς ὀµµάτων εἰληφότας 
φόβον νεώρη τῆς ἐµῆς ἐπεισόδου· 
ὃν µήτ’ ὀκνεῖτε µήτ’ ἀφῆτ’ ἔπος κακόν. 
ἥκω γὰρ οὐχ ὡς δρᾶν τι βουληθείς, ἐπεὶ 
γέρων µέν εἰµι, πρὸς πόλιν δ’ ἐπίσταµαι 
σθένουσαν ἥκων, εἴ τιν’ Ἑλλάδος, µέγα. 
ἀλλ’ ἄνδρα τόνδε τηλικόσδ’ ἀπεστάλην  
πείσων ἕπεσθαι πρὸς τὸ Καδµείων πέδον, 
οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς στείλαντος, ἀλλ’ ἀστῶν ὑπὸ 
πάντων κελευσθείς, οὕνεχ’ ἧκέ µοι γένει 
τὰ τοῦδε πενθεῖν πήµατ’ εἰς πλεῖστον πόλεως. 
ἀλλ’, ὦ ταλαίπωρ’ Οἰδίπους, κλυὼν ἐµοῦ  
ἱκοῦ πρὸς οἴκους. πᾶς σε Καδµείων λεὼς 
καλεῖ δικαίως, ἐκ δὲ τῶν µάλιστ’ ἐγώ· 
ὅσῳπερ, εἰ µὴ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων ἔφυν 
µάλιστα δ’ ἀλγῶ τοῖσι σοῖς κακοῖς, γέρον, 
ὁρῶν σε τὸν δύστηνον ὄντα µὲν ξένον,  
ἀεὶ δ’ ἀλήτην κἀπὶ προσπόλου µιᾶς 
βιοστερῆ χωροῦντα, τὴν ἐγὼ τάλας 
οὐκ ἄν ποτ’ ἐς τοσοῦτον αἰκίας πεσεῖν 
ἔδοξ’, ὅσον πέπτωκεν ἥδε δύσµορος,  
ἀεί σε κηδεύουσα καὶ τὸ σὸν κάρα  
πτωχῷ διαίτῃ, τηλικοῦτος, οὐ γάµων 
ἔµπειρος, ἀλλὰ τοὐπιόντος ἁρπάσαι. 
ἆρ’ ἄθλιον τοὔνειδος, ὢ τάλας ἐγώ, 
ὠνείδισ’ ἐς σὲ κἀµὲ καὶ τὸ πᾶν γένος; 
ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τἀµφανῆ κρύπτειν, σὺ νῦν  
πρὸς θεῶν πατρῴων, Οἰδίπους, πεισθεὶς ἐµοὶ 
κρύψον θελήσας ἄστυ καὶ δόµους µολεῖν 
τοὺς σοὺς πατρῴους, τήνδε τὴν πόλιν φίλως 
εἰπών· ἐπαξία γάρ· ἡ δ’ οἴκοι πλέον 
δίκῃ σέβοιτ’ ἄν, οὖσα σὴ πάλαι τροφός.  
 
 
Noble sirs, dwellers of this land, I see from 
your eyes that a sudden fear has seized you 
about my coming; yet do not shrink nor let 
loose an unkind word, for I have come with no 
wish to do any harm; I am an old man and I 
know very well that the city I have come to is 
powerful, if any of Hellas has might. No, I 
have been dispatched, such an age as I am, to 
prevail upon this man here to follow me to the 
land of Cadmus, not because one man sent me, 
but charged by all the citizens, since it came to 
me by birth to mourn for this man’s calamities 
more than any other of the city. Come, 
unhappy Oedipus, hear me and come home. 
All the Kadmeian people justly call upon you, 
and I most of all; so greatly do I – unless I was 
utterly born the basest of men – sorrow at 
these evils of yours, old man, seeing you be 
misfortunate, a stranger, and always a 
wanderer and with one poor girl as a traveling 
companion. Ah me, I never thought she would 
fall to such a depth of outrage as that which 
this poor girl has fallen into, always tending 
you and your head with a beggar’s way of life, 
in such youth yet not been wed, but a prize for 
the first comer to seize. What a cruel reproach, 
oh wretched me, I have uttered against you 
and me and our entire race? But indeed open 
things cannot be hidden, so then you by the 
gods of our fathers, Oedipus, obey me and 
hide this, by willingly returning to the city and 
the homes of your fathers, after a friendly 
goodbye to this city; it deserves it; but your 
home city by right ought to be reverenced 
more, as it nursed you long ago. 
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Creon begins his speech by addressing the noble chorus (ἄνδρες χθονὸς τῆσδ’ 
εὐγενεῖς οἰκήτορες, 728), but precisely what he means by ‘noble’ is soon revealed. His 
episteme (ἐπίσταµαι, 723) is that the Athenians are noble because their city is powerful (733-
734). It is in terms of power that he evaluates the worth of the other characters, namely by 
their status compared to his. He condescendingly judges Oedipus by his outward appearance 
as a weak old man (744) and evaluates his worth according to his usefulness for the 
advancement of Thebes. Creon makes a show of mourning for Oedipus in his miserable exile 
(745-747) and for Antigone because  her status is lowered by association with Oedipus (747-
752) yet, unlike Theseus, Creon does not see Oedipus and his daughters as equals because he 
does not pity them. His so-called exclamation of pity is really self-regarding (753-754). 
When seeing Oedipus and his daughters, Creon sees the disparity in status between them 
rather than the individuals themselves. He only mourns for them because, as they happen to 
be related, their bad fortune reflects poorly upon himself (738-739). He highlights Oedipus’ 
and Antigone’s isolation from society in contrast to his own position which sees the city 
(741, 758) and the gods of their fathers on his side (756). Through the action in the lines 
following this speech, Creon reveals the violence of his ethics.  
Creon is obsessed with gaining power and status. Like Odysseus in the Philoctetes, he 
shapes his behavior according to kairos; that is, what the particular moment dictates (808, 
826-827). Creon initially tries to get his way through deceit, promising that he does not 
intend any harm (732) because he is a weak old man and no threat to such a powerful city. 
However, he is not skilled in deception, and his expressions of pity scarcely conceal his 
contempt and selfish motives. Because Oedipus immediately sees through his hypocritical 
mask, Creon resorts to open violence. His veiled threats (813-814) soon turn into blunt 
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threats that Oedipus will suffer pain (816). His insincerity is demonstrated when he reveals 
that he had in fact already seized one daughter even before he spoke to Oedipus (818-819) 
and now intends to take the other (821), though he vows not to touch Oedipus (830). This 
vow is swiftly repudiated as his anger heightens (874-875), for he subsequently threatens to 
seize Oedipus himself (858-864). Boldly disregarding the claims of xenia, Oedipus’ personal 
best interests, and the sovereignty of Athens, he seeks power for himself. Creon, treating 
them as instruments for his own use, has no respect for those who like Oedipus and his 
daughters do not have power. He regards the daughters as his belongings (830-832; 839) and 
therefore considers himself justified in violently seizing them for the purpose of blackmailing 
Oedipus. With similar reasoning to that employed by the Atreidae of the Ajax, Creon believes 
that, because they are weaker and inferior, the girls must yield to him, regardless of the fact 
that he does not have their personal best interests in mind. Only the immediate threat of 
greater power by Theseus (862) prevents Creon from getting his way: he is unmoved by 
Oedipus’ moral argument (939-959). In return, he vows to seek retribution when opportunity 
allows (956-959;1036-1037).   
Creon’s reasoning, his obsession with status, and his unrestrained emotions are the 
opposite of Theseus’ sophrosyne. His violent actions (903), impiety (823), unrestrained anger 
(874), and insolent actions (877, 960) stem from his concept of nobility as being strictly 
determined by birth. Creon, in seeking to gain the things commensurate with his noble birth, 
ends up behaving contrary to his nature, as Theseus states (904-918). His ancestry makes him 
seem just, but his actions are wrong (937-938).  
Creon’s behavior is succinctly and chillingly expressed when he responds to the 
chorus’ cry that his action constituted hubris: “It’s hubris, but you will have to deal with it” 
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(883). Creon himself derives pleasure from being ‘kind’ against the will of others (775); in 
wrongfully treating both Oedipus and the city that protects the suppliant (1029) he is able to 
enjoy a sense of superiority that suits his obsession with status: “… the cause of the pleasure 
felt by those who insult is that, in treating others badly, they are more fully showing 
superiority.”19 As an action, hubris is chosen, but in contrast to the noble characters who 
choose to protect the choice of others, Creon’s hubris leads to compulsion rather than choice. 
In lines that invite a contrast with Tecmessa’s eugenes aner, Oedipus says that Creon’s 
charis brings no charis (779). Creon’s behavior is so rephrehensible because he abuses his 
good fortune, position, and power to harm others. Even if his actions were for a just cause, 
his flagrant disregard of law and use of force makes him a disgrace to his family and his city 
(904-918). On the pretext of benefitting his philoi, Creon prevents philia. He divides 
daughters from father, Oedipus from his friends, and himself from any true filial connection. 
The implications of equating nobility of birth with nobility of character are fully 
revealed in the final lines of Creon’s first speech. He asserts to Oedipus that his birth city, 
despite its present corruption and the fact that she disowned him, should be revered more 
than foreign Athens, the noble city of merit (759-760). Reduced to its most basic premise, 
Creon’s argument is that chance outcomes of fate are more important than merit and personal 
responsibility. In such reasoning there is, ultimately, no room for choice. 
  
                                                
19 Rhetoric 2.2.6. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The telos for a human, Aristotle argues in the Nicomachean Ethics, is eudaimonia, 
which is “complete and self-sufficient (autarkes)”20 By self-sufficient he means “the things 
which by themselves make life choice-worthy and lacking in nothing.”21 For the characters of 
Sophocles’ tragedies, the greatest impediment to eudaimonia is time – “all things are 
withered by mighty time” (Ajax, 714) – but their greatest impediment to complete success in 
the face of time is their own human nature: mortal ate and impulsive emotions prevent clear 
judgments. Oedipus’ anger leads to patricide, instigating a series of misfortunate events, and 
to an unwillingness to listen to others. Deianira, out of a paralyzing fear for the future, does 
not realize that the ‘love potion’ given to her in the past by Nessus is in fact a deadly poison. 
Philoctetes is so occupied with Neoptolemus’ past deceit he does not realize that his honesty 
is the mark of a true friend and that the advice to go to Troy is for his own good. Elektra is 
unaware that her claim to justice rooted in her victimhood is very similar to that of her 
mother whom she despises so much. Ajax fails to see the madness in trying to rectify hubris 
with hubris. Antigone and Creon fail to see their own hypocrisy and refuse to acknowledge 
that the other side’s claim has a degree of justice to it too.  
The three ignoble characters examined in this thesis through their narrow reasoning 
are hypocritical and commit extreme acts of violence and hubris in the name of justice. They 
believe they are seeking autarkeia, but in reality, having mistaken the attributes of self-
sufficiency for the thing itself, they pursue their own narrow definition of success to 
                                                
20 Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b 20-21. 
21 Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b 8-11. 
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extremes. Though they, like the noble characters, enjoy self-sufficiency in a certain sense 
because of their noble birth and the resources it provides, their self-sufficiency is not 
‘complete.’ The noble characters, in contrast, through philia gain a more ‘complete’ self-
sufficiency than material wealth or status could provide. They use their status and resources 
to help others and in doing so help themselves. 
The political success of nobility is philia. Friendship is the strongest communal bond 
and protects the rights of individuals while ensuring the common good. Odysseus protects the 
individual excellence of Ajax from the Atreidae’s shame. In so doing, he also upholds the 
customs of burial and the merit-based rewards of warfare that unite the community. Because 
of Neoptolemus’ noble actions, Philoctetes is able to express his individual right to choose 
what he wants for himself while being shown that what is best for himself is also for the 
common good at Troy. In helping Oedipus, Theseus not only gains a friend but a blessing for 
his city. 
Philia, in addition to being a political success, is also a personal success. A true friend 
is a personal pleasure in itself as Neoptolemus stated: “whoever knows how to do good after 
receiving good is a friend more precious than any possession” (672-674); but, in a somewhat 
paradoxical way, philia also ensures self-sufficiency by leading to the success that is brought 
about by sophrosyne, a freedom from ate. For the characters of Sophocles’ tragedies others 
are needed to act as a mirror for their own thinking and actions, as Odysseus said to 
Agamemnon: “You win when you give in to friends” (Ajax, 1354). Because their sophrosyne 
stems from pity and because pity requires another person to be present for it to be aroused, 
the noble man must interact with others to gain a mastery over himself.  
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Sophrosyne allows a mastery over oneself as it enables the emotions to be subjected 
to choice. Although no one can choose when first to feel an emotion, he can by opening 
himself to persuasion ‘diffuse’ the emotion, as Robert Solomon argued. An impulsive 
reaction through self-awareness becomes a matter of choice. Theseus realizes he is angry 
with Creon, but through his awareness he is no longer being angry but acting angry. His 
emotion is now subject to choice; he can choose to pursue, restrain, or dismiss his anger 
accordingly. He chooses to check his anger lest it lead to personal vengeance rather than 
justice according to law (OC, 904-918).  Odysseus restrains the hostility he feels toward Ajax 
for his attempted murder, thereby turning his pity into an active choice (Ajax, 121-126). Once 
he is aware of his own pity and the ramifictions of Odysseus’ ethics, Neoptolemus chooses to 
follow his pity and help Philoctetes (Philoctetes, 1074-1080), but he also later chooses to put 
his pity for Philoctetes aside in order to prevent Philoctetes from harming Odysseus 
(Philoctetes, 1295-1304). Thus, the virtue of sophrosyne is not to live a life devoid of 
emotion, but to be willingly self-aware, to self-examine, and to challenge both emotions and 
pre-held notions.22 This power over oneself is good for the individual and the state – hence 
tragedy’s political importance. 
 Tragedy, which seeks simultaneously to arouse emotions and prompt reasoning, is 
effective in eliciting sophrosyne in the audience. Tragedy is able to be, as Oliver Taplin 
phrased it, “essentially the emotional experience of its audience,”23 because tragedy first is 
                                                
22 In a sense, through the pity and fear that motivate their sophrosyne, the noble characters achieve Aristotle’s 
catharsis of emotion (Poetics, 1449b 23-28). Their ‘purgation’ of emotions is not an elimination but a 
distillation. In being able to choose whether to continue an emotion or not, the noble character rids emotions of 
their compulsive aspects and turns them into positive forces for action. 
23 Taplin, p. 10. 
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the emotional experience of the characters. The didacticism of tragedy is learning not what to 
think but how to think. As Taplin remarked, “understanding, reason, learning, moral 
discrimination” are not incompatible with emotion; what is “is cold insensibility.”24 The 
noble characters’ sophrosyne and their openness to the effects of emotion provide an 
example in how best to deliberate about tragedy and the serious questions it asks.  
Since all humans “are phantoms or a fleeting shadow” (Ajax, 125-126), “know 
nothing for certain” and “are all at sea” (Ajax, 23), and that no man “has a greater share in 
tomorrow” (OC, 568) than anyone else, all humans are essentially equal in birth. Therefore, 
what really constitutes acting according to ‘nobility’ is living according to an ideal phusis 
and not human capacity. As the phren is mortal, acting with sophrosyne is attempting to 
order the phren towards a state of perfect and continual safety (σῶς), the “deathless 
excellence” (Philoctetes, 1420) Heracles achieved. Herein lies the tragedy of these plays: 
humans desperately seek an excellence beyond their natural capacity. This pursuit is best 
described by the Greek word deinos – strange, wondrous, cunning, dangerous, and 
marvelous. As the chorus in the Antigone sing, “Many are the wonders, but nothing is more 
wonderful than man” (Antigone, 332-333).   
                                                
24 Taplin, p. 11. 
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